Security in post-conflict contexts: What counts as progress and what drives it?

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- Post-conflict transitions are messy and complex, depending on a wide range of interconnected drivers of change that need to be understood if we are to explain progress or regress.
- To capture the limited but important improvements in security that are likely to characterise post-conflict settings, understandings of security must be modest.
- What constitutes progress in conflict-affected contexts is likely to be deeply contested and issues of equity and sustainability will be key, including to enable security to act as a foundation for longer term development.
- Financial resources from multiple sources can play a critical role in underpinning – or undermining – progress in personal security.

Attempting to explain ‘progress’ is difficult when looking at any sector, but analysing progress in security can pose particular challenges. What is ‘security’ and who is it for? How can progress in security be measured? And in countries emerging from war, what counts as progress and what drives it? In some post-conflict settings, security problems persist yet significant improvements have followed periods of high insecurity and extreme violence. It is likely that the ‘progress’ in such cases will be partial, relative and non-linear but nonetheless important, offering the potential for other countries to learn lessons. The only moderate levels of security that characterise most post-conflict contexts must also be reflected in our definition of security itself.

ODI’s Development Progress project
aims to provide evidence for what has worked and why in a number of dimensions of development over the past two decades, including security. This paper sets out an approach to the exploration of progress in security in post-conflict contexts. This will be used in our own empirical research within the project – with case studies in Liberia and Timor-Leste – but we hope that it also provides a useful framework for others undertaking similar analyses. It is divided into four sections. First, it examines debates around the meaning of security, who it is for and who provides it. Second, it analyses what counts as progress in security and some of the challenges around measurement. Third, the paper turns to some of the key factors that shape improvements in different contexts, and fourth it considers the roles finance can play in security progress or regress.

Ultimately, identifying and explaining security progress in fragile, post-conflict contexts means that the understanding of security used must be appropriately pragmatic. This means that, while the people-centred approach of human security is critically important, analysis of the breadth of threats that this approach implies is unrealistic in low-capacity fragile states that face multiple and competing funding priorities. Therefore we focus on reductions in physical threats to personal safety as a more limited approach to security, but one that is important in protecting people and their livelihoods and providing the foundation for them to achieve progress in other dimensions of development.

1. Security: for what, for whom, by whom?

1.1 What is security and who is it for?

For much of the 20th century, security was understood in traditional terms, with interstate conflict seen to disrupt international peace and state sovereignty. During this time, armed conflicts wrought devastation and challenged development prospects in many parts of the world, but conflict was seen to be the preserve of military forces. After the Cold War and the subsequent decline of superpower rivalry, a greater focus on intra-state conflicts emerged, a result, in part, of the recognition of violence in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Sri Lanka (Kaldor, 1999). In these conflicts it was civilians, rather than soldiers, who increasingly bore the brunt of hostilities (Paris, 2001: 1).

This shift coincided with a broadening of the concept of security in the 1990s. New approaches offered an alternative to traditional security, in which self-interested states are seen to exist within an anarchic and competitive international system (Walt, 1991; Waltz, 1979). Human security was enunciated in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which promoted an individual or human-centred understanding of security and defined this as freedom from fear and want (UNDP, 1994). This definition has gained an increasing number of supporters and is now the approach to security used most frequently by donor agencies (Ogata and Sen, 2004; Kaldor, 2007; Paris, 2001: 87). Critical security studies that emerged in the mid-1990s (including influential contributions from feminist security studies) also broadened debates about what is being secured – be it the state, community or individual – and deepened understandings of what constitutes a threat (Krause and Williams, 1997; Tickner, 1992).

As Luckham and Kirk (2013a) argue, it is now clear that the ‘realist conceptualisation of security, which views security largely through the eyes of the state, whilst still enormously powerful, has lost its earlier monopoly over security thinking.’ Increasingly, security is viewed as a human entitlement. It is also seen to encapsulate a range of forms of violence such as criminal and domestic violence (Krause et al., 2011). The move towards citizen-centred understandings of security is essential in order to capture the kinds of insecurity that people now experience most commonly.

Security has also been widely recognised as a foundation on which long-term, sustainable development can be built, and the interdependence of security and development is reaffirmed routinely in global forums (United Nations, 2004, 2005). It is clear that improvements in security can also lead to improvements in other dimensions of development, such as education and healthcare, with people better able to invest in their futures and travel to school or clinics. Security is, therefore, moving up the global agenda, demonstrated most recently by efforts to have a security goal included in the post-2015 development framework. Despite this attention in international forums, however, there is still insufficient examination of the exact relationship between security and development in different contexts (Cox, 2008; Fishstein and Wilder, 2012; Denney, 2011). There are also criticisms about the ‘securitisation’ of development, with security programming often justified on the basis of the (in)security of donor countries, as much as of the citizens of recipient countries (Duffield, 2001; Waddell, 2006; Willett, 2005).

However, it is also important to bear in mind concerns about broadening the concept of security to the extent that it becomes largely synonymous with development.1 Human security, in its broadest conceptualisation, can involve protection from organised political violence and other forms of violence, as well as the threat of natural disasters, disease, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment and economic downturn (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 2012: 5). It is immensely difficult to determine whether progress has been made in achieving this kind of human security precisely because the components of this understanding of security are so varied and multiple. While recognising the multi-faceted nature of security and its connections with well-being and freedom, it is also important when undertaking analysis (for the purposes of this project) to use a definition of security that is more discrete. We must

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1 Such concerns have been expressed, for instance, regarding definitions of security as emancipation (Booth, 2007).
also bear in mind the only moderate levels of security that we are dealing with in post-conflict contexts. It is questionable to what extent any countries have achieved human or emancipatory security in full, let alone countries that have only recently emerged from conflict.

Based on the above discussion, we opt for a modest approach to security that focuses on personal safety from physical threat and the fear of physical threat – rather than broader understandings that would also cover protection from a lack of basic services, such as healthcare and education. This approach to security is human-centred, taking inspiration from human security and critical security studies, but is more limited in the scope of threats it considers. This is not to deny the importance of the broader aspects of security, but rather to recognise that in looking for progress in the context of post-conflict countries, it is unrealistic to set the bar at such aspirational levels. We focus instead on more modest, but undoubtedly important, improvements in protection from physical violence or intimidation.

1.2 Who provides security?

In many contexts, the state is a key provider of security through, for example, police, judicial systems and the military. However, the ‘deepening’ of security beyond a focus on the state has also enabled a recognition of the role played by non-state or hybrid actors in security provision (Albrecht and Kyed, 2011; Baker, 2009, 2010a; Scheye, 2009). There are no exact figures on the number of people who rely on non-state policing, but there is broad agreement that non-state providers resolve around 80% of disputes in the global south (Albrecht and Kyed, 2011: 1).

Where the state has a history of being absent, predatory or weak, some communities have created alternative channels to provide safety and resolve disputes. In addition, customary forms of dispute resolution are often used because they are viewed as more legitimate, trusted, accessible, affordable and more in line with social norms than the security services of the modern state (Albrecht and Kyed, 2011). In other contexts, institutions often described as ‘non-state’ are actually products or remnants of the state, such as local authorities that were created or co-opted by the colonial state to enforce indirect rule (Denney, 2012). The rise of private security companies is also important for both security provision and training (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010; DCAF, 2006).

The recognition that security is provided by a plural set of actors aligns with an increasing focus on different forms of public authority. New terms have emerged to capture this, such as ‘twilight institutions’ and ‘hybrid political orders’ (Lund, 2006; Boege, 2006). These aim to highlight the fact that in most contexts there are likely to be multiple and possibly intertwined ‘providers of security, welfare and representation, as the state shares authority, legitimacy and capacity with many other actors, networks and institutions’ (Luckham and Kirk, 2013b: 7). While non-state actors may provide more accessible and affordable security than the state, we make no claim about the desirability of non-state actors. Rather, we acknowledge the important roles that they play in the lives of so many people – treating them as relevant to a consideration of how people achieve (or do not achieve) security (Denney and Domingo, 2012: 6).

2. Identifying progress in security

Relevant indicators for progress in security are highly contested, linked to the definitional and conceptual debates mentioned above, as well as the paucity of data in many post-conflict contexts (World Bank, 2011). There are, of course, established datasets on battle deaths, rates of homicide and sexual violence. In addition, the Political Terror index, as well as data on refugees and internally displaced persons, can help to capture instances of insecurity where the state itself may be terrorising citizens. Indicators that measure people’s perceptions are an important complement to objective indicators when seeking to understand people’s experiences of security; and some aggregate indicators may also be useful, relating, for example, to the rule of law.

Yet a key challenge is that statistics on progress in security do not always correlate with actual improvements in security as experienced by people. For example, an increase in official crime rates, while seemingly indicating a rise in criminal activity, may actually represent higher reporting rates on the basis of improved police-community relations. Qualitative research, which takes seriously citizen’s perceptions of their own safety and security, will be essential. Despite their limitations, perception surveys can be a key part of this, if understood in their historical context and triangulated with other research findings. Some data may simply not be available; national statistics departments in fragile or conflict-affected regions seldom collect routine data on personal security.

While progress manifests in different ways across countries, there are some outcomes that can assist in determining whether progress has occurred, identifying both actual and perceived changes (where data is available). These include:
• reductions in different forms of violence by different actors (including armed violence, violence in the home, violence perpetrated by the state, etc.)
• improved perception of citizen security (past, present and future)
• strengthening of state and non-state security structures, in so far as this improves, rather than threatens, citizen security.

Analysis of these improvements is likely to raise as many questions as it answers. Two areas in particular, related to equity and sustainability, deserve greater elaboration.

First, has progress in security been equitable? We assume that not everyone will have experienced progress and that not all aspects of security will have improved. Progress in personal security can involve trade-offs and unequal distribution, reinforced by discriminations between rich and poor countries, among social classes, against women and minorities, and spatially between regions or between slums and suburbs...’ (Luckham, 2009: 3). People’s differing experiences of security play a role in their experience of other aspects of development – determining for instance, access to homes, land and livelihoods, services, goods and income and political voice (World Bank, 2011). Where security arrangements are inequitable, they can exacerbate grievances between groups and may provoke violence (Stewart, 2008). In such instances, where security is only achieved for some, does this constitute ‘progress’? Feminist scholars argue that where domestic violence or violence against minorities is high, it is questionable to what extent it can be said that there has been progress in security more broadly (Harders, 2011). These hidden forms of violence are important to acknowledge from a holistic security perspective so it is critical to understand where security provision is unequal between certain groups.

Second, is progress in security sustainable? The kinds of factors that influence progress – identified in the next section – can also influence regress. Taking a long-term perspective on security is, therefore, essential to understanding the nature of the progress that has taken place and whether or not this is likely to continue. This is particularly important in countries that have been heavily aid-dependent, where withdrawals of international support can leave shortfalls in funding to sustain progress.

3. Factors that influence progress in security

In a post-conflict environment, different overlapping factors will have a major influence on the nature, equity and sustainability of security. It is important to recognise that post-conflict transitions are multifaceted and rarely linear (Carayannis et al., 2014: 10; Dudouet, 2006: 12). Our analysis aims to review seven different factors that enable (or prevent) positive changes in citizens’ security, without the presumption that there will necessarily be continuity in these changes or that they will necessarily all
push in the same direction:

- whether the underlying drivers of conflict have been addressed
- politics, elites and incentives for pro-citizen reform
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes
- security and justice sector reform
- citizens, social movements and civil society
- the role of international donors
- regional dynamics.

Each factor requires empirical investigation to determine how it operates in practice in particular contexts. It is also likely that additional factors will also emerge as relevant in specific cases.

3.1 Underlying drivers of conflict

While systems of exclusion and violence that exist during peacetime can be exaggerated by conflict, violence can also be entrenched during peacetime if the underlying causes of violence remain unaddressed (Keen, 2008: 16). Wars may end, but that does not mean the underlying conflicts that triggered violence are over, pointing to the need to make careful use of the terms ‘post-war’ and ‘post-conflict’. The structural factors that contribute to violence may be political, social or economic but are always highly context-specific, so it will be important to acknowledge the history and ongoing role of potential drivers of insecurity in order to highlight the nature, equity and sustainability of progress.

There is a vast and divided academic debate about the causes of violence\(^2\) that this paper cannot address in full. For example, Stewart (2008) stresses the importance of grievances arising from horizontal inequalities between culturally formed groups;\(^3\) Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify the opportunity costs of conflict; and Fearon and Laitin (2003) highlight factors such as poverty, political instability, a large population and rough terrain that make insurgencies more feasible. Others have analysed the relationship between resources and conflict (Ross, 2004), pointing to the historical and political ecology of how resources are negotiated (Le Billon, 2001; 2012). An important debate within these arguments is ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ based explanations of conflict – the former focused on combatants’ desire for material advantage and the latter on perceived injustices (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Keen (2012) argues that both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ likely stem from other, perhaps more fundamental, motivations such as the desire for security, respect or even some measure of care.

Some have attempted to identify broad societal traits as the drivers of violence and conflict, such as ‘ethnicity’\(^4\) (Huntington, 1993) and ‘barbarism’\(^5\) (Kaplan, 1994; 1996). These accounts have largely been rejected (Richards, 1996; 2005) and have been criticised for not having explanatory power in and of themselves (Keen, 2008: 14). More broadly, as Stewart (2000: 3) states, it is certainly not the case ‘that conflict is inevitable because of primordial ethnic divisions, nor that it is the outcome of underdevelopment and that policies to combat low incomes and poverty will also automatically reduce the risk of conflict.’

Mono-causal explanations are unlikely to provide explanations for why violence and insecurity occurs in all times and places. Rather, a multidimensional conception of the specific drivers of violence and insecurity, embedded in a detailed understanding of a country’s history, social context and politics, yields a richer and more nuanced understanding of why and how violence manifests. This was apparent in the causes of war in Sierra Leone, for instance, where popular mono-causal explanations that centred on ‘conflict diamonds’ gave way to more nuanced explanations of long-standing grievances about governance breakdown at both formal and informal levels, as well as entrenched inequality and corruption (Richards, 1996).

3.2 Politics, elites and incentives

At the highest level, citizen security is influenced by politics – the political climate, policies and decisions that sanction certain forms of behaviour and shape institutional responses to insecurity. The incentives for these policies and decisions are likely to be defined by the political settlement and its embodied power relations (Putzel and Di John, 2012). As such, our perspective places less emphasis on particular institutional forms (such as democracy) as signifying ‘progress’ and more on change in the underlying set of power relations that informs them. Evidence from Uganda and Rwanda, for example, appears to indicate that ‘democracy’ (national and local) is, at best, a weak source of pressure for performance if top-down disciplines are absent (Booth, 2012: 42).

Institutions are widely conceptualised as the ‘rules of the game’ in society that shape and constrain human interaction and individual choices. They tend to support dominant ideologies and power relations in any given context, either through coercion or managed consent (North, 1990: 3; March and Olsen, 1989). Where power is held by an elite few, or based upon patronage, we need to understand how these actors are incentivised to encourage

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\(^2\) Violence can be thought of in two ways: first, as direct physical violence, the absence of which has been called negative peace; second, a much broader range of violence, including structural, symbolic and cultural violence (Galtung, 2011).

\(^3\) Econometric work argues that these risks are heightened up to three-fold where political, social and economic inequalities combine (Ostry, 2008). Cramer (2006), however, argues ‘the idea that inequality leads to instability or conflict and that conflict has exclusively negative effects on growth grossly oversimplifies the real relationships and the nature of their interaction, and can actually be misleading.’

\(^4\) Huntington (1993) argues that contemporary conflicts are largely explained by cultural and ethnic differences that lead ‘civilisations’ to clash.

\(^5\) In an influential 1994 article, Kaplan argued that growing population pressures and the strain of resources that this creates leads to social and ecological breakdown – citing the examples of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
progress in security. As DFID’s Building Peaceful States and Societies (2010: 34) argues, ‘political elites engage in service delivery for different reasons, such as promoting social cohesion or consolidating their power base and buying loyalty.’ An understanding of the political economy of decision making – both the official narrative and the role of personal relationships and informal rules – will be essential in explaining any progress made. This also requires recognising wherever democratic choices and citizen preferences or the influence and pressure of international actors have incentivised change in policies and decisions.

3.3 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
Civil-military relations are likely to be a key factor influencing progress. In a variety of contexts, the ways in which the military and other combatants are treated in post-war environments have proved to be a crucial ingredient in long-term security. An important factor in this respect will be the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants. The extent and nature of disarmament and demobilisation – for example, whether ex-combatants are given training, employment, payments or political appointments – differs widely in different contexts, often as a result of the perceived threat they pose to state and citizen security, as well as their ability to negotiate their own position.

Former-combatants may play a significant role (either formally or informally) in the political system of post-war states. In Timor-Leste, for example, former combatants have played a crucial role in post-conflict life and the Government pays them a lifetime pension in recognition of their contribution to independence, as well as in an effort to ‘buy the peace’ (ICG, 2013: 3). In other contexts, ex-combatants may find themselves politically, socially and economically marginalised, particularly in cases such as Liberia and Sierra Leone where abuses were committed against combatants’ fellow citizens. This raises questions about how former combatants can be reintegrated into society, an element of DDR that has been consistently under-financed and under-analysed (Torjesen, 2013). The very idea of ‘re’-integration may also involve the assumption that the social conditions before violent conflict should be ‘re’-created, which often will not be possible or desirable (Utas, 2005). The analytical value of the category ‘ex-combatant’ has also been questioned in some post-war contexts, where vast numbers of citizens may have resorted to armed violence (Käähkö, 2014).

3.4 Security and justice reform
Security and justice reform (SJR) commonly refers to changes in the security and justice sectors of post-conflict states, or those countries transitioning from communism or authoritarian rule. These reforms are often led by or linked to donor support and can have a major influence on citizen security. The security sector is broadly understood to include four interlinked sets of actors: core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and the rule of law institutions, and non-statutory security forces (GSDRC, 2013: 4; OECD DAC, 2007).

The relationship between the police and citizens is likely to be a crucial component of progress in security. In post-conflict contexts, the police may be absent or provoke fear in citizens. Police forces are often militarised in terms of their training, equipment, roles, institutional capacities and mindset, which requires the institution itself to be demilitarised. SJR includes a strong focus on police reform, typically involving technical interventions and focusing on organisational structures, training (often gender- and human rights-focused) and the implementation of community policing. Research in South Sudan and Liberia details the monumental challenges faced in changing police cultures to become more gender-sensitive (Salahub, 2011).

Equally, an improved justice system may enable citizens to seek redress for crimes against them, which may lead to an increased sense of safety because of the deterrent effect of legal sanction. Similarly, military reforms may be relevant where insecurity has derived from a lack of discipline within the armed forces.

Non-state actors may play a substantial role in providing security for citizens. Whether governments and others seek to reform, engage or ignore non-state security providers depends upon a host of factors, including perceived competition between state and non-state providers, sources of legitimacy of non-state providers and their record of rights abuses (Smits and Wright, 2013). SJR tends to focus on elite-driven and top-down changes, with the experiences and perspectives of local citizens often ‘under-represented in security sector institutions such as the police, in the development of national security sector policy and programming and in international debates about SSR’ (Salahub, 2011: 2). A key challenge is to determine where progress can be attributed plausibly to local level, bottom-up changes, alongside more formal, top-down reform processes, and how the two interact.

3.5 Citizens, social movements and civil society
Demand-side influences are often neglected in relation to security, yet a number of factors can be important here. First, civilians may play a substantial role in improvements (or deteriorations) in their own security. This includes establishing coping mechanisms and community resilience and protection, such as neighbourhood-watch groups at the more positive end of the spectrum and gangs and vigilantes at the other. Second, civilian oversight and accountability can be important in ensuring that government relations with the police and military are conducive to human...
security (GSDRC, 2013). Third, the role of citizens, in the form of social movements and civil society, may be important in advocating improvements in citizen safety and security and for innovative local-level practices that result in progress. Women’s groups, for instance, played an important role in pushing for a peace agreement in Liberia, and established ‘Peace Huts’ throughout the country to help resolve local disputes (UN Women, 2011).

Of course, these three factors can also manifest themselves in ways that have a negative influence on personal security; organised local action is not always a force for ‘good’ (Putzel, 1997). Groups that claim to protect civilians with one hand may also abuse or extort from them with the other, and may promote the security of one group at the expense of others. Furthermore, civil society may include ‘religious fundamentalists and political bigots as well developmental or progressive organisations’ (Lewis, 2007: 60).

3.6 Role of international donors

Luckham and Kirk (2012) argue that ‘the real politics of donor engagement in stabilising fragile states and reforming their security institutions is a pressing research and policy concern, not least because it can have tangible impacts on the security and welfare of end-users.’ They go on to make a useful distinction between two kinds of policy spaces: those that are truly ‘donor saturated’, where donors, the United Nations and other international actors have a direct military and political presence (Afghanistan, DRC or previously Sierra Leone and Liberia) and those that influence security indirectly, through diplomacy aid and security assistance (such as, currently, Timor-Leste). Where the donor influence is indirect or focused on ‘softer’ security interventions under domains such as peacebuilding or community resilience, their effects may be harder to identify. Given the extensive involvement of the international community in many post-conflict countries, it is likely that this will have some impact on progress. Yet this should not overshadow the importance of in-country power dynamics, which will shape international reform efforts.

3.7 Regional dynamics of conflict and insecurity

The security of a state’s citizens is intricately bound up with regional dynamics of conflict and insecurity, either as direct targets of transnational violence, as warring parties themselves, or as bystanders who are affected by conflict between neighbours. This is perhaps demonstrated nowhere more than in the Central African Republic, where domestic factors have been exacerbated by its location between six other countries, including Sudan, South Sudan and DRC. As Carayannis et al. (2014: 10) argue, ‘While the battlefield may be local, violence transcends territorial boundaries.’ Unsecured borderlands may be one of the most likely sources of insecurity, given the often asymmetric provision between the centre and periphery of states.

These areas can be sites of complex interactions among a variety of armed groups from multiple countries – interactions that need to be understood in order to identify the nature and extent of security provision with any accuracy (Luckham and Kirk, 2012: 29).

4. The role of finance

Financial resources are likely to be vital for supporting any progress in security. Domestic resources, mobilised through taxation and royalties, can be as important as external inflows from aid and private sector investment. Alongside these macro-level forms of finance, less obvious (or indirect) forms of finance for progress at the local level should be considered, such as remittances and household-level funding for community security initiatives. Understanding how such financial flows have played a role in change processes is not an easy task: while it may be relatively easy to trace sources of police funding, it will be much more difficult to track finance that supports changes in attitudes, such as perceptions about the importance of combating domestic violence. It is also possible that some channels of finance can undermine security, for example those involving criminality, rent-seeking or unregulated exploitation of natural resources. The relevant mix and influence of financial flows over security issues in any given context is likely to depend on a range of factors. This section explores the various forms of finance and current trends.

4.1 Financing from public expenditure

As a country recovers from conflict and strengthens its local institutions, domestic financing emerges as the most significant source of resources to support security-related investments. Here, public expenditure on security institutions, such as the army, police and justice bodies, is a critical factor in supporting the development of the security sector. However, it is difficult to reach a position where the state can support its own security infrastructure sustainably, and there are also challenges in equating security sector spending with improved personal security.

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9 Here we use the OECD list of fragile states – which overlap significantly with post-conflict or conflict-affected states (OECD DAC, 2014: 2).
Data on revenue generation by fragile states – often considered to face the greatest security risks – illustrate the challenges related to the sustainable financing of security. For the period 2010-2012, only one-third of states for which data are available can generate tax revenues of at least 15% of GDP, with only seven generating tax revenues of above 20% of GDP at present (INCAF, 2014). Recent OECD analysis highlights how challenges such as over-reliance on natural resources (and possibly aid), weak institutional capacity, low tax morale among citizens and unsuitable tax exemptions are undermining efforts to mobilise sufficient revenues (OECD DAC, 2014).

Given that spending on security in many countries is likely to be high regardless of revenue capacity (as such investments are perceived to be vital to regime or national security), the expansion of revenue is as much about ensuring that the scale of security spending is appropriate and does not undermine spending in other development sectors, as it is about maintaining the security sector at the required capacity levels (Byrd, 2010). This point is backed up by a significant body of research highlighting how high levels of military spending in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa have undermined development prospects (Collier, 2009; Dunne, 2010). Whether countries are able to ensure an appropriate level of security spending will depend upon the broader macroeconomic and political context of the country, which will determine government policies and the financial resources available to support this among other competing priorities.

A significant factor that helps to determine the degree to which security sector financing helps, in turn, to support improvements in personal security relates to the oversight and accountability of the sector. This can be particularly important in post-conflict contexts, where ‘the relationship between the security sector and the population... [can] be exploitative and predatory, in which individuals and groups are more victims than beneficiaries of underpaid and ill-governed security services’ (OECD DAC, 2005). In such contexts, strong oversight of the security sector (both by parliament and independent actors/mechanisms), citizen groups and the media are all critical to support linkages between security sector financing and personal safety (OECD DAC, 2008).

### 4.2 Financing from external development partners

In conflict and immediate post-conflict environments, external actors are likely to have a key role in providing finance and other resources to support security, especially where widespread conflict has undermined national resource generation and institutional capacity. One of the main areas in which external actors provide the majority of finance is in supporting peacekeeping operations. A wide and growing range of peacekeeping organisations are currently supported by international donors, with the main ones contributing to peacekeeping efforts in low-income countries.

- **United Nations** – the UN peacekeeping budget grew from $2.8 billion to $7.8 billion between 2001/02 and 2010/11, but has since stagnated.
- **The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)** – NATO currently has operations in Afghanistan (by far the largest mission), Kosovo and the Horn of Africa, and supports the African Union’s peacekeeping operations.
- **European Union** – in 2004, the EU established the Africa Peace Facility, which has since disbursed EUR 740 million, mainly for peace operations in Somalia, Sudan and the Central African Republic, in partnership with African regional peacekeeping bodies (European Commission, 2014).
- **Africa regional peacekeeping bodies** – a number of regional organisations have been expanding their peacekeeping operations, especially the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Beyond peacekeeping, external development partners provide support to a wide range of security-related activities that qualify as official development assistance (ODA). These trends are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that security-related ODA (excluding peacekeeping) increased sharply in 2006-2009 – reaching a peak of $3.7 billion – before falling steadily to $3.1 billion in 2012. This is broadly in line with trends in global ODA, which have been affected negatively by the austerity measures introduced in many donor countries following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. The largest contributors to these areas of ODA spending are the USA, EU institutions, Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the UK (OECD DAC, 2014).

However, there is less current clarity about trends in a range of additional security-related activities supported by external development partners. First, there are donor activities that do not qualify as ODA and that are, therefore, poorly reported; particularly any activities that involve the military directly, such as capacity-building and even human-rights training (Pachon, 2012). Second, there are broader governance, justice sector and social-development activities that have implications for personal safety but that are hard to disaggregate from available data (Pachon, 2012). Finally, there is limited reporting about the scale and nature of the activities of international NGOs in security-related areas – an important gap given their significant role (Goodhand, 2006).

Beyond these challenges associated with the tracking of external support, a number of issues relating to the effectiveness of this support in improving personal security are apparent – four are highlighted here. First, many donor-supported interventions to improve security do not support local ownership and accountability, failing to engage with or integrate local civil society and informal security interventions (Caparini, 2010). Second, much support for SJR provided by external partners is not reported in the budgets of developing countries, nor is there effective reporting. This causes fragmentation and incoherence that also undermines accountability (Byrd, 2010). Third, donor interventions often have short time horizons, driven by their own foreign policy.
interests as well as funding cycles that can limit their effectiveness in tackling long-term and complex security issues (Sherman, 2010, Sedra, 2010). Fourth, in order to promote the sustainability of security sector development, it is important that donors ‘right-size’ their assistance – ensuring that their interventions are of a scale and ambition that is suitable for local resourcing to maintain in the long-term (Middlebrook and Peake, 2008). In contexts such as Afghanistan, concerns have been raised about whether donors have addressed this issue in a way that is suitable (Byrd and Guimbert, 2009).

4.3 Household spending, private sector investments, philanthropy and NGOs

In many countries, particularly following periods of conflict, it is local community-based and ‘informal’ or ‘non-state’ security actors that play a key role in addressing people’s everyday experiences of security (Sedra, 2010; Baker, 2010b). There is a growing understanding of these dynamics in the security sector, although how such initiatives are financed has been largely neglected. It is clear that in many places, communities and households fund local security mechanisms – such as neighbourhood-watch groups, customary adjudications and, in some cases, community policing structures (Denney and Jenkins, 2013). It also seems likely that remittance flows to post-conflict countries – which vital where the local economy has been devastated – play a role in responding to conflict challenges, yet the percentage of household expenditure and remittance flows devoted to security provision is unknown (Pardee Center, 2013). The role of philanthropy, private sector and NGO flows in supporting improved security (or, perversely, contributing to insecurity) is also under-researched, although the rise of private security companies, particularly in Africa, is widely noted (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010).

5. Conclusion

As set out in this paper, Development Progress will explore a citizen-centred understanding of personal security that stops short of a comprehensive human security approach, examining progress in the security arena in post-conflict contexts where personal safety and security remains a daily concern for many people. As a result, we are not holding these cases up as success stories to be emulated. Rather they are instances where progress, however incomplete, has been achieved against remarkable odds and where lessons may be drawn for countries that face similar challenges.

This paper has set out a number of factors that drive (or hinder) security progress. Inevitably, these factors will be highly context-specific and require empirical investigation to determine how they influence the nature, equity and sustainability of security. The factors identified here serve here as an initial list to guide further investigation – both for our project but hopefully for others too. We are also interested in what governments and donors can learn from stories of financing security progress to inform their decisions about what to support in post-conflict settings where there are multiple and competing priorities. It is hoped that through an examination of these issues, we can refine our understanding of what constitutes progress in security and how it can be achieved and accelerated in post-conflict settings.
References


